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ABSTRACT

Teacher unionism, as evidenced by the United Federation of Teachers (UFT) and the American Federation of Teachers (AFT) is a conservative moderating force that seeks to preserve and strengthen the present bureaucratic-professional governance of schools. This paper concerns the policy impact of the UFT. Specifically, it describes the levels of participation as well as the policies and goals that have been articulated and/or institutionalized by the UFT. (Author/MLF)

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SCHOOL GOVERNANCE: THE PARTICIPATORY ROLE OF THE UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, LOCAL 2, AFT.

Presented by:

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On November 9, 1980 the United Federation of Teachers (UFT) commemorated the 20th anniversary of an event that was billed as the UFT's "first strike." The symbolic and objective importance of that commemoration was succinctly implied in one of the announcement paragraphs that appeared in the union paper. That paragraph read:

> The one-day strike in 1960 led to the winning of collective-bargaining rights for school staff members in New York City, and later for school staff and public employee across the nation. [1]

The Board of Education, perhaps with pressure from Mayor Robert F. Wagner, who had earlier in his administration granted collective-bargaining rights to other city workers, succumbed to teacher pressure and granted NYC teachers the right to hold an election to choose a bargaining agent. Thus, New York City became one of the first, if not the first, to recognize and legitimate the teachers' right to collective bargaining.

The next step in its ascent to power and participation was for the UFT to win the support of a majority of New York City teachers and thus become <u>the</u> collective-bargaining agent. At that time the UFT claimed to have had about 2,000 members out of a teaching staff that numbered approximately 38,000. Among other organizations vying for the collective-bargaining status, the chief rival to the UFT was an affiliate of the National Education Association (NEA). The name of the NEA affiliate was the Teachers Bargaining Organization.

The key issue, as well as the "prize," in the selection of a collective bargaining agent is neither money nor scope of bargaining. Rather, the issue is recognition -- organizational recognition and legitimation. It is the recognition of the union by both management and rank-n-file labor that allows a union to participate in the institutional decision-making process; and, concomittently, it is the recognition and the participation that carries both responsibility and authority -- the essence of power.

Many researchers of teacher unionism have focused upon the legitimation process addressed above to posit the notion that to bargain with teachers' organizations was by definition to give-up control, to relinguish control of the educational institution;[2] and/or, to bargain with teachers' organizations was to significantly change the participants in decisionmaking as well as the mode of decisionmaking.[3] The thrust of this evaluative research is that collective bargaining mitigates the power of the central office bureaucrat-professional, and/or the power of the school building administrator, and/or the power of the lay school board. Researchers who posit this evaluation focus upon: (a) the rate of salary increases teachers receive after unionization; (b) the establiashment and tightening of grievance machinery as well as evaluation procedures after unionization; and, (c) the micro nature of the collective bargaining act that pits two "diametrically opposed" forces -- labor vs. management -- in a battle for the allocation of institutional

resources. For example, Anthony M. Cresswell and Michael J. Murphy, who do an admirable job in summarizing, synthesizing, and evaluating research on teacher unionism, write that:

1. Teacher unionism has shifted primary decisionmaking away from the bureaucratic-professional mode into the negotiation mode and/or the legislative/political mode.[4]

2. Teacher unionism has added to school decisionmaking a process that includes professional negotiators, as well as professional mediators, who sit on both sides of the table, i.e., from labor and management. These professionals are primarily lawyers and/or accountants who subsequently change and modify the dialogue of negotiation so that the effect is that both direct management and direct labor representatives are removed and/or placed in a secondary role.

3. Collective bargaining, primarily a bilateral process precludes students, and their representatives, i.e., parents and/or lay groups from participating.

Thus, while the collective bargaining process appears on one hand to open decisionmaking, in that decisionmaking becomes bilateral, it more often than not is conducted by negotiation professionals who are more comfortable with each other by training and expertise than they may be with either labor or management. In fact, the use of "outside" professionals continues even after the contract is signed as both sides maintain an office of grievance and

labor-management relations, which displaces to a large extent the degree of direct participation by rank-n-file labor, elected union officials and the school board as well as the school superintendent. In addition, as the contract continues, there is the use and reliance upon mediators and/or arbitrators to adjudicate grievances -- again the use of the "outside" professional. The cumualtive effect of the entire labor-relations process, according to Cresswell and Murphy, is the weakening of the bureaucratic-professional mode of decisionmaking.

If one were to confine one self solely to the act of collective bargaining and labor-management relations, the evaluations of Cresswell and Murphy are keen and on target. However, on the macro-level, the findings of this researcher lead to the opposite view. That is, the teacher union movement, as is the American labor movement in general, is NOT in fixed, diametrical, ideological opposition to management, be it lay school board or the bureaucratic-professional. While it may be goal of a given union, or unions, to increase the scope of bargaining on the micro-level, labor history in the U.S. tends to indicate that those unions which have received both management and government recognition, i.e., legitimation and status, have not bargained for, nor at any time demanded, control over a given corporate or civic institution. Rather, the American labor movement has bargained for participation in decisionmaking. In fact, that participation seems to have increased the size of institutional bureaucracy, not diminished it. By and large, the

recognized American labor unions have bargained for union recognition, wages and fringe benefits as well as working conditions, not control.[5] Consistently, officials of the recognized and legitimated labor unions in the U.S. articulated the position that their union was not out to usurp the authority and the perogatives of management; but rather, only to secure the position of the worker against arbitrary management action while simultaneously seeking increased worker benefits. "The long-run result," writes Lloyd G. Reynolds, " is not the displacement of management by the union, but an equlibrium between the expansive power of unionism and the resistance that management never ceases to offer." The American labor movement, in which the UFT has played a significant part, is best described as a "pragmatic" force, not a radical force. An example was provided in a 1974 interview with Albert Shanker on "Meet The Press."[6] When asked about strikes, and the use of strikes during a labor impasse, Shanker stated that strikes result when there is no other choice. In addition, Shanker continued: "People who want to achieve an objective find ways of developing compromises." Those compromises for Shanker, as well as other American labor union leaders, are the "mutuality of interests that is recognized by both sides."

Again, in 1975 during an interivew on public service television, Albert Shanker was faced with another question regarding the conflict and tension between teacher unions and/or management professionals and/or local school boards. Shanker replied in part:

> Conflicts are open now and I don't think there is anything wrong with conflicts here and there being

viewed and being open. I would say that a good deal of the conflict that is there is there because of the beginnings of the collective bargaining relationship. Its very much like the relationship between labor and management in the 1930's. And now when you see the president of the Auto Workers Union and the presidents of the auto companies going to see the President of the United States together and urging a similiar policy with respect to importation of petroleum, pricing policies, and everything else, we say that a sense of maturity has developed. I see the same thing in teacher-school board relationships. In New York City, the longest such relationship, there is much more cooperation than there is conflict....in other communities where that relationship is just beginning, or where there is the first contract or first conflict, they will go through a few rounds before that conflict is taken care of and they develop that mutuality of interests that generally comes about and is recognized by both sides.[7]

In their summary statement, Cresswell and Murphy arrive at the same macro conclusion expressed by Shanker when they write in part:

In that regard we are hopeful about collective bargaining. It does not seem likely to us that it will seriously disrupt the educational process. There will, of course, be cases where there will be unnecessary and especially bitter strikes and confrontations. In general, however, each side will discover the nature of rational bargaining processes and will begin to analyze more carefully their interests and the other interests represented.[8]

In sum, when the mutuality of interests is recognized, strikes are lessened and cooperation is strengthened, which is exactly what happened in New York City. It was the UFT that led the other New York municipal unions in foregoing wage increases while simultaneously purchasing municipal bonds in order to prevent New York City bankruptcy. At this time UFT leadership was under significant rank-and-file pressure to lessen and/or withdraw that cooperation. The UFT leadership held to the position of cooperation and ultimately had the union constitution ammended to mitigate rank-and-file rebellions.[9] Thus, teacher unionism in New York City dovetails American unionism, in that, both seek participation in institutional or corporate decisionmaking, as it affects the workers' security, salary, and working conditions, rather than control.

In fact, there is another side of collective bargaining--implied in all of the above--which must be explored. That is, the role played by contractual clauses in bestowing recognition and legitimation upon the union and its officials as an institution. In effect, collective bargaining is institution creating as well as institution maintaining. The collective bargaining agreement often explicitly states that each side will do nothing to destroy the other and in practice do everything to help the other side survive. The mutuality of interests that Shanker refers to leads to the creation of dependency--a bilateral dependency or symbiosis. Not only are unions and management dependent upon each other with regard to the everyday processes of the workplace,

as they live out the terms of the contract, but in addition, they become interlocked in sets of interests that include concern over the input factors and variables that affect the institution as well as the marketability of the product. In these last two concerns, both union and management often lobby in the local, state, or national arena for legislation and/or bureaucratic regulations that are favorable to their mutual interests. This is the use of legislative/political decisionmaking that Cresswell and Murphy refer to as displacing or mitigating the professional's power. In reality, however, the UFT has lobbied unilaterally and/or jointly with the Board of Education to preserve and strengthen professional bureaucratic power, not replace it. Several prime examples are: (a) the NYC Decentralization law in 1968--which was the UFT answer to community control;[10] (b) the lobby effort against vouchers and tuition-tax credits--both of which are preceived by the UFT as anti-professional as well as anti-public school;[11] (c) the UFT's position in favor of standardized testing of both teacher and pupils while lobbying <u>against</u> legislation aimed at the testing industry;[12] and, (d) the UFT's immense activity in inservice training as well as its lobby effort at having the NYS Board of Regents declare teachers as a state recognized group of professionals, in the same way that doctors, lawyers, architects, etc., are recognized as professionals

What I propose here today are the notions that:

1. Teacher unionism, as evidenced by the United Federation of Teachers and the AFT, is not out to control education, nor is it out to displace the bureaucratic=professional mode of decisionmaking at the state education department or at the

local education level;

2. Teacher unions, as evidenced by the UFT/AFT, solidly support the notion of public schools as defined and modified by the school "reformers" of the 20th Century who wanted a centralized, bureaucratic form of school governance with professionals in firm control over the short and long-range process of the schools; and,

3. Teacher unionism, as exemplified by the UFT/AFT endorses the premise that public schools exist to provide skills to students in order to foster and support "equality of opportunity" in the workplace. Shanker is on record as being against the notion that schools, and by implication, that society, should support the goal of "equality of results."[13]

In sum, the UFT is not a radical or revolutionary force, rather it is a conservative moderating force that seeks to preserve and strengthen the present bureaucratic-professional governance of schools. Any significant threat to the bureaucratic-professional mode is made into a crisis and a massive UFT rhetorical and political lobbying effort is unleashed to thwart and defeat the enemy, whether it arises from the external environment or from within the union's rank-and-file.

What is central to this paper is the policy impact of the UFT. Specifically, to describe the levels of participation as well as to describe the policies and goals that have been articulated and/or institutionalized by the UFT. However, before preceeding, it may be necessary to restate and review the assumptions of this paper.

To begin with, those individuals who write of teacher unions as conflict producing and/or usurpers of authority and power operate from a micro perspective--a perspective that focuses upon the early stages of labor-management relations when recognition and legitimation are at stake, when community values and norms may be at stake. Over the long run, collective bargaining is not conflict producing; rather, collective bargaining serves as a socio-political mechanism to reduce conflict. Specifically, the contract between labor and management serves as a mechanism to reduce conflict in two ways: objective and symbolic. First, it provides labor with a formalized, legitimate, and standardized methodology and process to negotiate wage demands and working conditions as well as negotiate and settle greviances. This serves to reduce the competition between individual workers for the resources, status and priviliges that would be allocated by management; and, conversely, management is precluded from over-utilizing informal, interpersonal communication mechanisms and/or arbitrary action to play "divide and conquer" and/or cooptation. A union contract either leads to or reinforces/reifies the bureaucratization of the workplace. In sum, the labor-management contract can be viewed as part of an on-going process of rationalization of the workplace that began over 100 years ago. A process that depends upon the professional-bureaucratic manager.

Secondly, the collective-bargain agreement stands as a symbol that management recognizes the dignity and the

rights of the worker. It not only bestows objective power, but it also generates an aura of hope and of caring; its symbolic function is one of reassurance. The symbolic function, while dependent to significant degree upon the objective quality of the contractual clauses, can and does stand alone in the worker's mind. Worker feelings of reassurance, protection and security produce the aggregate effect of docility and acquiesence in the workplace.

Now, to review and describe the UFT experience in NYC.

LEVELS OF PARTICIPATION

With regard to levels of participation, the United Federation of Teachers has and continues to accrue power and status by asserting its presence on both the local level and the state level. On the local level, the primary vehicle for participation has been the union contract, which includes clauses for ongoing consultation with the Central Board of Education. This ongoing consultation involves not only matters directly related to the current contract, it also involves matters of "experimentation" being considered by the Central Office staff. The second vehicle for participation is political activity. UFT political activity takes the form of: (a) supporting "approved" politicians with money and phonebanks, as well as recognition and legitimation in the form of union sponsored "dinners" and "awards" that are amply reported in the union paper; (b) suuporting candidates for elected positions on the 32 community school boards in New York City; and, (c) asserting its public opinion influence, via weekly advertisements in The New York Times, on items and issues that relate directly to socio-political issues of public school education, e.g., selection of a NYC Public

School Chancellor, tuition tax credits, research on social mobility. All of these activities are provided with wide coverage in the union newspaper, which serves to reassure its membership of the leadership's activity on their behalf, and which serves to notify current, as well as potential, holders of public office that the UFT is an organized institution that stands poised to reward and support friends.

On the state level, the UFT was instrumental in formalizing a coalition of teacher union locals to enhance lobby efforts on a statewide level. That coalition is known as the New York State Union of Teachers (NYSUT). When originally formed, NYSUT included the NEA affiliates in New York State. In 1979, NYSUT spent $88,659.00 in its lobby efforts with the New York State legislature. That sum placed the teacher lobby sixth in the ranking of New York State lobbyists. In addition to its lobby efforts while the legislature is in session, the UFT, via NYSUT, supports candidates for state political office. The UFT asks each of its members to contribute ten dollars toward the political activities of the union, which is labelled the "VOTE/COPE" fund. On June 13, 1979, Alber Shanker sent a letter to all UFT members that read in part:

> Dear UFT Member:
> Once again we are collecting in every school for UFT VOTE/COPE. The COPE drive this year is more important than ever, so I hope you will contribute $10 today . . . .
> On every political level -- federal, state, and city -- we have made gains, but we also face enormous problems . . . .
> If we don't participate fully in these elections, none of the difficult problems we face will decided

our way. And participating fully means a substantial 'war chest' to support the candidates we endorse...and make things tough for those who oppose us. Jobs, salaries, work conditions and the kind of services we can provide to children depend on our playing a pivotal role in the political arena. It is no longer enough to have skilled, experienced negotiators--first comes the political power and the political skill to get the money to negotiate about. And without it, there can be no real negotiations. Your COPE contribution is more urgently needed than ever. Please give it today to your chapter chairperson. It will keep our union strong. It represents an investment in your future.

Fraternally,

Albert Shanker
President

In the above letter, Shanker makes it very clear that the union's leadership perceives a relationship between contract negotiations, political assertiveness and school decisionmaking. The connecting linkage is the contract, i.e., the collective bargaining agreement.

Specifically, while the UFT can trace its organizational roots through New York City teacher unionism back to 1916, for all evaluative purposes the UFT as a legitimated institution does not begin until the first contract was signed in 1962. With that contract the City of New York recognized the UFT not only as <u>the</u> bargaining agent--to consider and discuss

with them "changes in salary schedule, improvement in working conditions and adjustment of certain complaints," -- it also bestowed upon the UFT the right to serve as the sole representative of each individual teacher in the grievance procedures. This right of exclusion was not only to be applied against the officers and/or other designated officials of a "minority organization," but also against those individuals who "regularly perform" activities for minority organizations that include "distributing literature, collecting dues, circulating petitions, soliciting membership, or serving regularly as spokesman at teachers' meetings.[15] Thus, the contractual combination of recognition and exclusivity provided the UFT with management's support in its drive to gain membership and power. Again it must be remembered that at the time of the first contract, the United Federation of Teachers had approximately 2,000 members or about 5-10% of the total teaching staff. In addition, that first contract, in Article XII, provided for continuous support of the UFT's leadership in the form of "consultation." Article XII reads:

MATTERS NOT COVERED

> With respect to matters not covered by this agreement, which are proper subjects for collective bargaining, the Board agrees that it will make no changes without appropriate prior consultation with the Union. [16]

Article XII not only reinforced recognition, but, in addition, bestowed upon the UFT, via the on-going consultant status, access to instituional information as well as access to pivotal management decisionmakers. Thus, the UFT could emerge

after that one year contract and face its actual and potential membership, as well as the general public and rest of the labor movement, with an image as the legitimated union, newly recognized with newly acquired experience and with a developing relationship with management. From that symbolic and objective position, the UFT would grow in membership and in political power. Opposition from within the union and/or from other sources, i.e., the NEA, would never again become a serious threat to the UFT leadership.

The explicitly stated goals of the United Federation of Teachers can be found in Article II of its constitution:

> (b) To protect the schools against unsound economy and against efforts at domination by political, economic, religious, or military groups.
>
> (c) To promote education as a social agency for developing the capacities of the young, for enlightening adults, and for working toward a society motivated by the ideal of service and democratic participation.
>
> (d) To make education employees aware of their political responsibilities.
>
> (e) To advance the economic and professional interests of education employees.

(f) To establish the active participation of education employees in the formulation of educational policies.

(g) To work for democratic administration and supervision.

(h) To protect education employees whenever necessary.

(i) To represent education employees in collective bargaining and in all other dealings with the city, the state, and other employers.[17]

The obvious key to the above objectives lies in the linguistic pattern of each objective as well as in the Union's interpretation of: "political responsibilities," "democratic administration and supervision," and/or in the objective of advancing "the economic and professional interests of education employees."

Fortunately, for researchers, the UFT has maintained for twenty years a consistent leadership; a leadership that has stated that it will not step aside and will continue to remain in office indefinitely and/or until voted out of office. Given the chronological age of the UFT/AFT leadership; it is safe to assume that the interpretation of the organizational objective will not significantly change in the next decade. Further, twenty years of organizational history have provided researchers with enough symbolic and objective data from which to describe the participatory effect of the United Federation of

Teachers in the educational political arena. The evaluation of UFT's role in the political arena is not a part of this paper. The evaluation is dependent upon how one views effects of UFT rhetorical symbolism and/or political action as well as the aggregate effect of each contract. Nevertheless, an aggregate effect is discernible and describable.

We may proceed by focusing upon: (a) the aggregate effect of the contracts; (b) the aggregate effect of UFT policy statements and position papers that were not necessarily contractualized but form the symbolic and objective essence of the UFT; and, (c) the aggregate effect of UFT action in the state legislature. However, for the purposes of this paper all three are combined. Reference is made to the aggregate effect of all UFT actions under the Shanker leadership.

In its aggregate, the UFT has achieved the highest levels of participation in both the bureaucratic-professional mode of decisionmaking and in the legislative/political mode. In the former, the UFT through its contract is privy to information regarding the daily operations of the system, and in addition, must be consulted monthly on policy. In an "interview" with Ronald Edmonds, the Assistant to the NYC Public Schools Chancellor, it was said that without UFT support, tacit and explicit, the present public school administration would not have been able to progress as

far as it has in its "School Improvement Program."[18]

Thus, with regard to New York City and New York State, the UFT is an active and full participant in school governance on both the local and state level as well as on the school-building level. As a participant in decisionmaking, the UFT uses three modes of participatory behavior: the bureaucratic-professional mode, the negotiation mode, and the political/legislative mode.

CURRICULUM PARTICIPATION

The 20th anniversary commemorative edition of New York Teacher, the NYSUT/UFT paper, stated:

> Early in its history, the UFT recognized that the union must be involved in educational policy decisions so that members could truly function as professionals.[19]

Within two years of the first contract, the United Federation of Teachers had proposed to the New York City Board of Education its first major curriculum proposal. That first proposal was called the "More Effective Schools Program," and it received both community and Board of Education support. The theoretical base of the proposal was the deficit model theory which prescribed compensatory education.[20] It was the UFT's major vocal proposal for the next ten years. In the mid-1970's, as the deficit model theory was attacked as being inherently racist and/or as being used to legitimate institutional racism, the vocalness of the UFT's support diminished dramatically. However, the UFT and the AFT have not abandoned the deficit model paradigm. On October 19, 1980 Albert Shanker

wrote:

> What should be well known after all these years of studies and experience is that poverty and descrimination have obvious educational consequences, that disadvantaged children need special help to overcome handicaps. This, after all, has been the purpose of most federal aid to education for the past 15 years....[21]

In 1967, the Unted Federation of Teachers, after a strike, had the NYC Board of Education contractualize a ten million dollar commitment "for the purpose of making further progress in the development of new programs for the elementary schools."[22] The same contractual clause bound the NYC Board of Education to maintain its support for the UFT's More Effective Schools Program. That section of contract was entitled "Program For Educational Excellence," and it called for the establishment of a work group "to make appropriate studies and to submit recommendations to the Board of Education for the utilization of the"[23] ten million dollar special fund. That work group was to consist of two representatives from a parent or community group, two representatives from the union and two from the Board of Education. The parent or community group representatives were to be chosen by the agreement of the Board and and Union.

This 1967 contract was significant for two other reasons. First, in Article 17, the UFT agreed to curriculum experimentation only if they were consistant with the union contract. Second, the UFT through Article 18 became partner to "procedures for handling special behavior problems."[24]

From 1967 until the present, the UFT has been a significant partner in the curriculum decisionmaking in the New York City public schools at both the school building level and the central office level. since that time the UFT has advocated and/or supported, along with the NYC Board of Education, the following:

1. Nationwide recruitment drives for minority teachers;
2. The career ladder program for paraprofessionals;
3. College-bound programs for disadvantaged students;
4. Teacher Centers as well as union sponsored and union funded teacher inservice programs;
5. A "Dial-A-Teacher" program; and,
6. The "More Effective Schools Program" as well as "Educare."

The current UFT effort in curriculum reform is unquestionably in the area of inservice teacher training. Through federal-funding the UFT operates and staffs Teacher Centers in all the five boroughs of New York City.[25] In addition, through foundation funding as well as Central Board cooperation, the UFT runs a mini grant replication program called Impact II. According to the UFT, Impact II is a program designed to identify, document, and spread the word about successful, classroom-based programs created by teachers."[26] In addition, the United Federation of Teachers has published a set of six curriculum guides in the area of social studies: Organized Labor; Puerto Rican History and Culture; Study Guide on Italian-Americans; The History of Black Americans; and, Topics in Jewish-American Heritage.

In sum, the United Federation of Teachers, in its 20 year history has accomplished, to a significant degree, all its organizational

objectives, as stated in its consitution. In becoming an equal partner with the Central Board of Education, the United Federation of Teachers has neither sought to undermine bureaucratic-professional control nor has it sought to undermine the traditional grounds or warrants for public education. Rather, the United Federation of Teachers' participation in school policy-making is one that supports traditional education, educational testing, and governance by credentialized professionals. [27]

In the words of Sandra Feldman, a high ranking teacher union official in New York City and in New York State, as well as in the American Federation of Teachers, the UFT has a vested interest in preserving the bureaucratic-professional mode of school governance. Feldman wrote:

> Those genuinely interested in saving the public schools should recognize the necessity of joining with the UFT in the battle for braod goals shared by the school community. The union will not disappear as a major factor in public education. It will survive as long as the schools do. [28]

FOOTNOTES

[1]"Celebrate 20th Anniversary On Teacher Union Day," New York Teacher/ UFT Bulletin,November 2, 1980, p. 3A.

[2]William J. Grimshaw, Union Rule In the Schools (Lexington, Mass: D.C. Heath, 1979).

[3]Anthony M. Cresswell and Michael J. Murphy with Charles T. Kerchner, Teachers, Unions, And Collective Bargaining in Public Education (Berkeley, Calif.: Mc Cutchan Publishing Col, 1980).

[4]Ibid., pp. 192-213.

[5]Lloyd G. Reynolds, Labor Economics and Labor Relations, 6th Edition (Engelwood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1974), pp. 420-427.

[6]"Meet The Press," NBC-Television, Box 2111 Washington, D.C., Interview with Albert Shanker, Sept. 1, 1974.

[7]"In Conversation: Dick Scott Host," Public Broadcasting System, WNET-NYC, Interview with Albert Shanker, February, 1975.

[8]Cresswell and Murphy with Kerchner, Teachers, Unions, And Collective Bargaining in Public Education, p. 489.

[9]The latest significant change came in 1979. At that time the UFT leadership proposed and actively campaigned for change in tenure of UFT chapter chairmen and UFT chapter delegates to the Delegate Assembly. The tenure was changed from one to two years. In addition, Chapter Chairmen were now made voting delegates to the Delegate Assembly. Before 1969, during the period of intense school strife and significant rank-and-file rebellion over UFT policy on "Community Control/Decentralization," the UFT Constitution was ammended to decrease the number of voting delegates per school from 1 per 20 teachers to 1 per 60 teachers.

[10]Sandra Feldman, A Teacher Unionist's View: The UFT and School Conflict (N.Y.: The United Federation of Teachers, undated).

[11]Roy R. Pellicano, "Teacher Unionism and Bureaucracy: A Case Study," Educational Forum, March, 1980, pp. 305-319.

[12]Albert Shanker, "The Nonsense of Attacking Education Tests: We Need More Exams For Pupils And Teachers," New York Teacher, Nov. 9. 1980,p. 6.

[13]Ibid.

[14]Selwyn Raab, "City's Lobbying in Albany Cost $279,860 in '79," The New York Times, June 3, 1980, p. B1.

[15]Agreement Between The Board of Education of the City of New York and United Federation of Teachers, Local 2, American Federation of Teachers, AFL-Cio, Covering Classroom Teachers, July 1, 1962--June 30, 1963, p. 3.

[16]Ibid., p. 28.

[17]Constitution of The United Federation of Teachers, Local 2, American Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO, correct as of January, 1976. United Federation of Teachers, 260 Park Avenue South, New York City, 10010.

[18]Response made to this researcher's question during "Question/Answer" session at Oct. 31, 1980 Conference on Urban Education sponsored by the Council For Basic Education. Dr. Edmonds was the Keynote Speaker.

[19]"20 Years After: We Remember," New York Teacher, Nov. 9, 1980, p. 12.

[20]Roy R. Pellicano, The United Federation of Teachers and the Deficit Model of Urban Education, unpublished doctoral dissertation, Teachers College, Columbia University, 1977.

[21]Albert Shanker, "The Nonsense of Attacking Education Tests....," New York Teacher.

[22]Agreement between The Board of Education of the City of New York and United Federation of Teachers, Local 2, American Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO, covering Day School Classroom Teachers and Per Session Teachers, July 1, 1967-Sept, 7, 1969, p. 1.

[23]Ibid.

[24]Ibid., pp. 71-72.

[25]"Innovative Thinking Abounds: Teachers Share Classroom Ideas Via Impact II," New York Teacher/UFT Bulletin, Nov. 9, 1980, p. 8A.

[26]Ibid., p. 4A.

[27]Roy R. Pellicano, "Analytical Essay--The Policies And Politics of the UFT," Educational Studies, Winter 1979/1980, pp. 357-373.

[28]Sandra Feldman, A Teacher Unionist's View: The UFT and School Conflict, p. 14.